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Warning systems are an essential component of risk management for natural threats.  
They trigger active and/or passive countermeasures.  This paper introduces the need 
for and use of warning systems through the review of recent major natural disasters 
(the Sumatra Tsunami, the 2005 Alpine Flood, the 2005 Hurricanes, Katrina and Rita) 
but also the potential flu pandemic.  Positive and negative lessons are drawn from 
these cases.  This is followed by a review of two specific warning systems which 
together with the preceding cases leads to a list of requirements for warning systems. 
 These reviews also show that it is desirable to have tools with which different 
warning systems and their role in risk management can be evaluated.  A procedure 
based on decision making under uncertainty allows one to do so.  The basis of this 
procedure and its application to warning systems, including some sensitivity analyses 
to demonstrate practical consequences are then shown.  Decision trees and Bayesian 
trees are used in this context. 
 The paper leads to the conclusions that the basic elements of warning systems 
are associated with problems, which eventually may be solved.  The formal risk 




Warning systems intend to provide information, which allows people to avoid threats 
or at least to reduce the consequences affecting them and causing material losses.  
Consequences affecting people range from fatalities to physical and psychological 
injuries.  Material losses cover a wide range from personal property to life supporting 
facilities ranging from agriculture to physical infrastructure.  Some effects involve 
both personal and material aspects such as losses of socio-political infrastructure and 
largely aesthetic damage.  By putting warning systems in the context of potential 
damage, one can assess their value and possibly prioritize them.  This is the approach 
taken in this paper.  This will not only allow one to evaluate the effectiveness of 
warning devices and processes but also to get an idea on the consequences if they do 
not function, including the effect of false alarms.  While all this applies to any threat, 
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the paper - in keeping within the topics of the conference - will concentrate on natural 
ones. 
 The paper will start with putting natural threats and warning systems into 
context through a brief review of several natural events, the December, 2004, 
Tsunami, the flooding in the Swiss Alps in summer 2005, hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
in summer and fall 2005, and the potential threat of the Avian flu, all of which 
provide ample evidence of natural threats and the performance of warning systems.  
Following these introductory examples, which will provide a glimpse of when 
warning systems were successful and when they failed, two established warning 
systems will be reviewed leading to a set of criteria that warning systems should 
fulfill.  From this it becomes evident that a fundamental, formal approach, which 
allows one to assess risk management in general and warning systems, specifically, is 
desirable.  This paper then makes an attempt in this direction by using the process of 
decision-making under uncertainty as a basis.  The formal decision making process 
will be introduced, and the formal risk management and updating through information 
(warning systems) will be discussed in detail.  It will be shown with a few sensitivity 
analyses how one can practically evaluate the effect of different factors influencing 
risk management systems.  All this will lead to the conclusions in which problematic 
aspects of warning systems will be summarized and suggestions made on how to 
proceed. 
 
Warning Systems in the Context of Recent Events 
 
The December 26, 2004 Tsunami 
 
As is well known and as e.g. Liu (2005) reports an earthquake associated with the 
release of tectonic strains at the subduction of the Indian Plate under the Burma Plate, 
specifically SW of Banda Aceh at 3.30°N, 95.78°E, occurred shortly before 8 a.m. 
local time on December 26, 2004, and caused a Tsunami.  The rupture is estimated to 
have propagated at 2 km/sec although more recent accounts talk about slower 
velocities.  More details and specific information will be provided in the keynote 
paper by Synolakis at this conference.  What is of interest here is the timeline of 
events shown below: 
 
0.59 GMT (7.59 local time) Earthquake 
1:30 Tsunami impacts Sumatra 
2:30 Tsunami impacts Southern Thailand 
3:00 Tsunami impacts Sri Lanka 
 Tsunami impacts coast of Southern India 
4:30 Tsunami impacts Maldives 






The Earthquake was recorded worldwide including Australia and India.  Evidently  
(WSWS, 2005)  the Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii was alerted at 8:08 and 
warned the other stations around the Pacific but at 8:14 notified these stations that no 
immediate Tsunami danger existed for the Pacific.  No specific Tsunami warning 
system including sensors and immediately applicable models supported by an 
adequate communication system existed in the Indian Ocean area.  The Swedish 
Newspaper, “Expressen” (12.28.04) claims that the "meteorology experts in 
Thailand" were meeting at 8 a.m. local  time and decided not to issue a warning as “a 
courtesy to the tourist industry".  Clearly these sources due to their political flavor 
(WSWS) or because of the traumatic loss of many countrymen (Expressen) are 
probably biased.  Nevertheless, there definitely was a lack of possible warning, as 
Synolakis et al., (2005) remark, in that no communication took place after the 
Adaman and the Nicobar Islands were hit in spite of intact communication systems; 
such communication could have saved many lives in Southern India and Sri Lanka 
where the Tsunami hit 2 hours later.  The same reference (Synolakis et al., 2005) on 
the other hand reports on some successful warning by the local government in the 
Maldives and individual short wave communication warning ship owners to move out 
of harbors. 
 The second aspect of the warning process, namely, the reaction of people once 
they receive the warning or when directly confronted with the threat and with 
sufficient time to do something also showed some interesting differences.  Synolakis 
et al. (2005) report on proper reaction by “moving vertically” either based on pre-
existing plans, knowledgeable hotel personnel or fellow tourists (from Japan e.g.) 
who knew how to react properly while others ran after the initial retreating waves and 
were killed!  Another aspect, which Synolakis emphasized during a talk at MIT 
(2005) with dramatic examples from Sri Lanka, is the effect of floating debris on 
injuries and fatalities.  This aspect is related to a more fundamental one, namely the 
type of structures subjected to potential tsunami waves and the effect of artificial and 
natural protective features (Darlymple et al., 2005; Synolakis et al., 2005).  
 Only somewhat related to the Indian Ocean Tsunami but definitely to 
Tsunamis in general is the possibility of false alarms.  According to Gonzales (2005) 
the March 28, 2005 earthquake caused panic in Sri Lanka with 10 deaths, since 
people were afraid of another big Tsunami.  On the other hand, properly designed 
warning systems can prevent false alarms as happened following the November 2003 
Aleutian earthquake when a Tsunami evacuation in Hawaii was called off in time 




The time interval between the earthquake and even between first indication of a 
Tsunami and Tsunami impact in e.g. Sri Lanka and Thailand would have been 
sufficient to warn people.  Large scale Tsunami models did exist to make adequate 
predictions after the fact and if applied in time would have been very useful in 
warning.  On the other hand, the lack of Tsunami oriented warning hardware ranging 
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from specific sensors to an established specific communication systems in the Indian 
Ocean area was a severe impediment. 
 Local topography caused significant differences in the run-up and impact on 
land.  Detailed run-up models did not exist.  Even if warned, the appropriate reaction 
depended on instinctual reaction or specific education of the affected people and on 
communication.  The latter has different components that did/did no work.  
(Communication from national center to affected communities, local communication 
and detailed on-the-spot instructions.) 
 Quite obviously warning systems have to be part of a complete risk 
management approach which consists of other measures such as properly designed 
structures and evacuation routes.    
 Warning systems have to be able to cover both sides - positive warning with 
adequate time to react properly and allowing one to call off countermeasures in a 
timely fashion. 
 
The August 19-21, 2005 Flood in Switzerland 
 
In late August 2005, the so-called Genoa Low (Figure 1) developed.  This weather 
pattern causes intense rainfalls on the Northern flank of the Alps and usually moves 
eastward.  This was also the case in August 2005 with flooding starting in 
Switzerland then moving East to Austria and eventually to Rumania.  The Genoa Low 
has historically caused major floods in Switzerland e.g. the Magdalena flood in 1342, 
the Emmental flood in 1837 and the 1868 Alpine flood (Luterbacher, 2005) but the 
August 2005 flood seems to have been associated with record rainfalls at least in 
regard to periods during which precise measurements were made (Figure 2).  Figure 3 
indicates where major flooding occurred during the August 2005 event.  The areas of 
primary flooding consisted of areas where strong rainfall and flood events are 
relatively well known (Reuss-Valley, Napf) but also others (lower Engadine) where 
such events are rare.  The map in Figure 3 indicates that the local distribution of 
flooding varies widely.  Clearly the scale compared to the other discussed events, 
(Sumatra Tsunami, Katrina, Rita) is much smaller but local differences apply also 
these are much larger events.  This local variability is the reason for describing the 
Switzerland flood in detail since it has a major impact on warning processes and 
systems.  Also, the total direct material damage was rather high, estimated at 2.5 
billion sfr (2.2 billion $) while the death toll was relatively low (6) (BWG, 2005).  
Finally, the first author of this paper was traveling into one of the affected areas just 
at that time and has thus had first hand experience at the time of the flood. 
 The main damage directly resulting from the rainfall was primary flooding 
with significant secondary damage caused by river erosion, scouring of infrastructure, 
deviation of rivers and depositing of river deposits outside river beds; several rainfall 
induced landslides also occurred.  The main problems were associated with the 
interruption of the main N-S axis effectively leaving only the Western N-S axis open 
(Figure 4) and this during the main travel season.  Secondary flooding further 
downstream involved, in addition to the usual and well known flooding of streets and 
 4
basements, additional characteristics in that large amounts of trees/branches were 
transported and became stuck under bridges and in rivers.   
 Regarding impact on human life, there were six deaths and about 2000 people 
were temporarily evacuated.  From this one can conclude that a combination of 
adequate warning time and functioning warning systems minimized impact on human 
life even in relatively rapidly changing situations.  (Alpine streams can literally flood 
in a few minutes.)  Much of this can be associated with local experience and the fact 
that the primary emergency responsibility is local (civil protection).  Higher level, i.e. 
cantonal and national support is subsidiary and is mobilized only if the local/regional 
authorities request it.  The cantonal and national organizations are, however, on alert 
such that subsidiary action can be mobilized with little delay.  In August 2005, this 
was mostly in form of airforce support with helicopters for evacuation and supply of 
isolated villages, and the army providing additional heavy excavating equipment and 
relief of personnel. 
 The warning systems and relevant infrastructure risk management involved a 
number of other measures such as the control of weirs which exist at a number of 
outflows of lakes and the mobilization of emergency repair equipment along old 
embankments (Figure 5). 
 On the other hand, the warning/advice to rail and road users was (based on 
personal experience) not as good as it could have been.  The accuracy of travel 
advisories was questionable in that certain roads were mentioned as blocked, while 
they were actually open and vice versa.  Similar inaccuracies occurred also in TV, - 




The large scale meteorological forecast was reasonably accurate although the extreme 
rainfall was not predicted.  A gap exists with regard to small scale forecasts.  This 
problem is recognized and it is subject to a research project on small scale flooding 
by WSL (Hegg and Vogt, 2005).  It will be interesting to see down to what level of 
regional resolution and accuracy of forecasting such a system will work. 
 The local civil protection capabilities were adequate regarding safeguarding 
human life.  The local infrastructure maintenance capabilities also were in most cases 
adequate to react to the consequences (debris removal, etc.) and where this was not 
the case the subsidiary aspect of upper level support appeared to work. 
 The national traffic/transportation guidance was not quite what it could have 
been.  This is probably associated with a lack of communication from the local to the 
national level.  (The lower level was justifiably preoccupied with dealing with the 
local emergency.)  Nevertheless, this gap has a wider economic impact (major 
disruption of transportation routes e.g.).   
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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
Hurricane Katrina, August 29 2005 
 
Hurricane Katrina approached the Gulf of Mexico in late August 2005 after an initial  
landfall in Florida as a Category 1/2 hurricane it crossed the Gulf, increased to 
Category 5 and then made landfall on August 29 as a Category 3 hurricane (Figure 6).  
The projected path initially put it right over New Orleans but then it moved further 
East and landfall occurred on the Mississippi coast line (Figure 6).  This coastline 
was, therefore, subject to the classic hurricane damage of high water, waves, wind 
and drenching rain.  New Orleans was not subject to a direct hit but to high surges 
from Lake Ponchartrain.  Nevertheless, observations showed that the lakeshore levees 
were not overtopped.  Damage occurred through the breaking of canal levees/walls 
along the London Avenue Canal, the 17th Street Canal and the  Inner Harbor 
Navigation Canal (IHNC) and the overtopping of the Michaud levee (for all these 
locations, see Map, Figure 7).  (Mlakar, 2006).  Many of the canals in New Orleans 
and thus also the London Avenue and 17th Street Canals are drainage canals which 
allow the six pumping stations (total capacity (50,000 cft/sec) to move water into 
Lake Ponchartrain.  Clearly a massive break as it occurred in August 2005 
overwhelmed the system (Hayes, 2005). 
 The breaking of the levees caused the major flooding as shown in Figure 8 
and leading to the many upsetting pictures shown in the media worldwide.  The death 
toll as of September 21, 2001 (CNI) was 1,033 (799 in Louisiana, 219 in Mississippi, 
13 in Florida, 2 in Georgia and Alabama .  Damage as of today is estimated at 
between 80 and 100 billion US$ but will most likely be higher.  The cause for the 
levee breeches is under investigation by a number of professional committees and not 
subject to this discussion, which will concentrate on issues related to the warning 
system regarding New Orleans. 
 Hurricane warnings are well established along the Atlantic/Gulf coastline but 
are hampered somewhat by the difficulty to predict exact landfall locations.  
Nevertheless, an evacuation order for New Orleans was given on Sunday August 28.  
A detailed evacuation plan, Figure 9, existed which had been developed and revised 
based on the experience with Hurricanes George in 1998 and Ivan in 2000 and, 
particularly, based on intensive traffic flow modelling by LADOT (Louisiana 
Department of Transportation).  The evacuation proved largely to be a success as 
emphasized by the traffic flow (Figure 10), corresponding to 480,000 vehicles in 48 
hours.  It is estimated that about 80-90% of the population was evacuated.  Also, 
based on this information, many people evidently left before the actual evacuation 
order was given.  What did not work was that there were still 100,000 – 300,000 
people left in the city of which roughly 100,000 could not evacuate because they did 
not have access to personal vehicles.  Plans existed based on “neighbor helping 
neighbor” and the use of public transportation buses which had to (and did to some 
extent) move people to the evacuation center at the Convention Center with the well 
known consequence there:  No further evacuation transportation from there, limited 
food, inadequate sanitation and security.  It should be noted that one of the reasons 
for the slow evacuation of the city’s poor people was also their reluctance to abandon 
 6
their property which, as the reports in the newspapers (again anecdotal) showed, was 
to some extent justified. 
 
 Hospitals and nursing homes are required by law to have evacuation plans 
which include the pre-arrangement of transport and the routes to take.  However, it 
appears that some of the same busses were promised to several entities.  The 
additional problematic aspect was the flooding which for a number of entities 
prevented evacuation by land vehicles.  From newspaper reports it appears that 
subsidiary transportation provided by the national guard (State responsibility) or the 
armed forces (Federal government) did not work as quickly as necessary. 
 A major factor in the initial disorganization was the apparent lack of clear 
assignments of responsibility to the local, State and Federal authorities.  Lacking 
communication and political infighting further complicated matters. 
 Another aspect again relating to risk management in a wider sense was the 
effect of floods on pollution.  Loose gas tanks are a standard occurrence in any flood.  
In addition, the New Orleans – Lower Mississippi River area is essentially a strip of 
chemical plants and the location of a number of historically polluted sites.  As Reible 
et al., (2006) discuss, this had major consequences on contamination of floodwater 




Large scale hurricane modeling together with a well developed evacuation plan are, 
in principle, the basis for a well working warning system.  What did not work was the 
part of the evacuation process relying on neighbor help possibly hampered by social 
resistance against evacuation. 
 Equally important is the fact that the consequences of the primary event 
(hurricane/storm surge) caused a secondary event (levee breaks with flooding) for 
which no warning system and also no adequate risk management plan existed. 
 Other lessons are the need to combine evacuation with protection of property 
and multi-level evacuation plans for emergency entities (hospitals and similar).  
Communication and clearly established responsibilities also appeared to lack. 
 Risk management and thus warning systems also have to deal with 
pollution/contamination as a consequence of natural threats. 
 
Hurricane Rita, September 24 2005 
 
Hurricane Rita, a Level 3 hurricane occurred roughly a month after Katrina. Again, 
this hurricane evolved from a Level 1 to a Level 5 to eventually hit land at Level 3.  
Also, predictions put its landfall originally into the Galveston/Houston area (Figure 
11a) but it eventually hit land further East (Figure 11b) near the Texas/Louisiana 
border.  Information on death toll and material damage are more difficult to obtain 
than for Katrina.  It appears that about 100 people were killed and the material 
damage was 10 billion US$. 
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 The damage was again the classical hurricane damage along the coastline.  
The reason for discussing this case is the reaction to an event which was reasonably 
well predicted and for which the consequences were very much in everybody’s mind, 
having been exposed to Katrina and its consequences.  The Houston-Galveston area 
has a well developed evacuation plan with different evacuation zones depending on 
the hurricane level (Figure 12).  Evacuation of Zone A began September 21 at 6 p.m., 
of Zone B on September 22 at 2 am and Zone C at 6 a.m.  These are low lying zones.  
What was not expected was that also people from other areas tried to evacuate which 
led to the well known traffic jams as that shown for September 23 (Figure 13).  It is 
estimated that 2 million people evacuated (Harris County has 3.6 million inhabitants, 
Galveston County has 267,000). 
 This all occurred during a very hot period with temperatures up to 100°F 
(37°C).  Newspaper statements (e.g. NZZ Sept. 24/25, 2005, Boston Globe, Feb. 21, 
2006) claim that more people died during the evacuation than due to the hurricane 
itself. 
 On the positive side are the evidently complete and successful evacuation of 
the city of Lake Charles as well as of 605 oil drilling platforms in the Gulf.  Also 
refineries and other industrial plants were successfully shut down (as was actually 
also the case in Katrina).  Also, on the positive side was the reaction in New Orleans 
where some hospitals were evacuated by airlift and transportation/food supply in 




As mentioned above, the reason for discussing Hurricane Rita are the controllable and 
non-controllable aspects of warning systems.  While smaller cities and industrial sites 
were successfully evacuated, there was an unnecessary mass exodus from the 
Houston area.  Warning systems, therefore, have to address both sides of human 
nature, the “nothing will happen to me” as well as the “panic”. 
 
Power Outages in Spring/Summer 2003 and 2005 
 
On August 14, 2003, 62000 MW power production in the eastern US and Canada 
collapsed.  On June 22, 2005, the entire power supply of the Swiss Federal Railroads 
collapsed, and on September 28, 2005 all of Italy lost power.  Power outages are 
occasionally associated with natural threats (e.g. lightning) but this is not the reason 
for mentioning them here.  Power grids are purely physical and intensively controlled 
systems.  Also, substantial experience exists with power grid overloads.  
Nevertheless, massive failures can evidently occur very often because the human 
controllers are overwhelmed by non-prioritized alarm messages as was the case in the 





This is very much on everybody’s mind.  Simply recall that the “Spanish Flu” of 
1918/19 which appears to have started as an East Asian avian flu and was transmitted 
by US troops from Kansas to Europe eventually killed between 20 and 40 million 
people.  The initial phase was clearly “helped” by the fact that the troops lived in 
“close contact” which facilitated transmission.  Also rather than warning of the 
outbreak, it was initially kept secret for “military” reasons.  (The publication in 
newspapers in neutral Spain eventually led to the name Spanish Flu; Mörgeli, 2005).  
The eventual reaction of governments was a mix of reasonable reaction (prevention of 
assembly of people) and helplessness. 
 Looking at the predicted Asian flu pandemic, one is aware of the potential 
countermeasures, ranging from travel restrictions, to wearing face masks to antiviral 
drugs  and possible vaccination.  The question is how to time these measures to be 
effective and to prevent panic and major economic (personal to national) losses.  It is 
also interesting to note that pandemics can be modeled as any other (natural) threat.  
As a mater of fact, the small scale person-to-person transmission is very well known.  
Larger scale models on influenza pandemics do also exist and actually include the 
economic consequences (e.g. Meltzer et al., 1999).  Similar to other natural threats- 
models, e.g. for earthquakes, they formally include uncertainties.  In contrast to the 
other natural threats and thus a major problem is the fact that there is no possibility to 
calibrate these models before the pandemic hits. 
 
Summary and Conclusions from Tentative Lessons  
 
The cases described above and knowledge about other events and warning systems 
allow one to draw some generally valid conclusions: 
 
• Warning systems require a time interval between the recognition of the threat 
and the time of impact.  Hence, for earthquakes, at least with the present 
knowledge, warning is not possible.  However, if knowledge exists on general 
conditions that may lead to a sudden event, warning is possible.  Examples are 
rainfall induced landslides or flooding, and Tsunamis following earthquakes. 
 
• Very often there is a sequence of natural threats (earthquake or seaslide 
leading to Tsunamis -, rainfall followed by erosion leading to a landslide) or a 
threat followed by an infrastructure/organization failure leading to a second 
threat (Katrina levee breaks, Rita evacuation panic). 
 
• Clearly, physical warning devices which record the threat when it occurs 
(seismographs, DART (Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting Tsunami-
Buoys), rainfall measurement devices, etc.) as well as satellite and airplane 
based observations are of central importance.  Equally important are the 
communication systems, transmitting this information from the physical 
warning devices to control centers where these observations are interpreted, 
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usually making use of models, (see below).  It is, however, possible that the 
threat actually destroys the communication systems. 
 
• “Secondary” consequences such as debris in floods or contamination appear to 
be very important but rarely included in warning systems. 
 
• An essential part of warning systems are models of the threats.  These can be 
subdivided into large scale (large region) and small scale (small region, local) 
models.  The large scale models for major natural threats are reasonably 
adequate, possibly with the exception of the final tracking of hurricanes.  
Small scale models exist but the cases discussed have shown that many are 
missing.  It is questionable if they ever will be developed to provide complete 
coverage.  A prioritization is possible and advisable. 
 
 Both regarding large -  and small scale models is the necessity to be able to 
continuously and immediately update them while the event/threat is occurring. 
 
• Observations and model results need to be interpreted to make predictions.  
Most of these predictions will involve some degree of uncertainty.  The 
interpretation will then be used by decision makers to issue the warning.  As 
the cases have shown, this appears to be a weak spot in that decisions are not 
taken, decisions cannot be made because of overwhelming or confusing 
information, political reluctance or infighting. 
 
 Also, human error on any level from the top decision makers to the affected 
population needs to be anticipated and planned for in warning systems 
(political mess, Katrina; power failure, Switzerland). 
 
• Evacuation is the primary means for saving lives.  Evacuation requires well 
developed plans which are effectively communicated to the population.  
Education/rehearsal is an essential aspect producing “gut” reactions such as 
taking cover under benches/door frames in earthquakes, and adhering to 
evacuation plans. 
 
 Protection of property, particularly for the poor population is an essential basis 
for effective evacuation and thus saving lives.  This has to start well before the 
threat materializes by building confidence in the population that such 
protection will be provided. 
 
 Warning systems/processes leading to evacuation have to include the 
possibility to call off the warning and do so effectively.  In other words, the 
reversal of a warning and its consequence has to be as well planned as the 
issuing of a warning. 
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 Warnings systems have to avoid panic.  This is particularly difficult if the 
population is sensitized by an event that occurred a short time before. (Rita). 
 
• Warnings and countermeasures (evacuation, etc.) appear to work much better 
if organized and implemented on a small scale with upper level entities 
functioning in a subsidiary manner (flood Switzerland, industrial plants and 
small cities in Rita). 
 
• Physical infrastructure can be built to resist or at least survive the threat.  This 
plays an essential role in warning systems.   
 
Much of the preceding indicates that warning systems have to be very flexible 
and adaptable to the evolving conditions. 
 
Examples of Established Warning Systems 
 
As mentioned above, warning systems consist of devices capturing relevant signals, 
models for relating the signal to potential threats, people and procedures interpreting 
the modeled results, evaluating consequences and issuing warnings.  Such warnings 
have then to be communicated to potentially affected areas and lead to passive or 
active countermeasures.  Two examples are described below: the Puerto Rico 
Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System and the Swiss Avalanche Warning System, 




The Puerto Rico Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Procedure (PRTWMP) has been 
described by Von Hillebrandt-Andrade and Moreno (2004).  The tsunamis in this 
procedure are assumed to have an earthquake as their source.  Local tsunamis (up to 
24 minutes travel time triggered by an earthquake in the PRVI (Puerto Rico-Virgin 
Islands) region), regional tsunamis (24 minutes to 2 hours travel time) and distant 
tsunamis (greater than 2 hours travel time) are distinguished.  Based on detection of 
an earthquake by a monitoring station of the Puerto Rico Seismic Network (PRSN) 
and an evaluation of this information, the PRSN will issue one of 4 messages: 
 
1.  Felt Earthquake (Earthquake Magnitude < 6 if local, <7.5 if small distance, <8 
if greater distance; focal depth >60 km; earthquake under land; intensity < VII) 
No follow-up measures 
 
2. Tsunami Warning (Earthquake Magnitude > 6.5 in the PRVI region and focal 
depth < 60 km; magnitude > 7.5 beyond PRVI but with travel time < 2 hrs; 
intensity > VII in Puerto Rico; reliable reports of observed tsunamis locally and 
in Eastern Caribbean). 
Evacuate all low-lying areas since tsunami possible with 2 hours 
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3. Tsunami Watch (Earthquake Magnitude > 8.0 and shallower than 60 km in 
Caribbean west of 80°W, in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Atlantic Ocean 
beyond 35° and 75° W and 10° and 35°N; reliable reports on observed tsunami 
with possibility of reaching the Caribbean). 
Prepare for possible evacuation 
 
4. All clear (PRSN determines that conditions to issue a tsunami warning or watch 
are not met; or, if conditions are met, that there is no report on observed 
tsunamis; behavior of sea returned to normal) 
 
 
The Swiss Avalanche Warning System 
 
The following has been summarized from Bründl et al., 2004 and the WSL/SLF 
website. 
 The Swiss (Federal) Institute of Snow and Avalanche Research in Davos 
(Schweizerisches Institut für Schnee- und Lawinen Forschung - SLF) issues a regular 
avalanche bulletin at 5 p.m. each day during the avalanche season.  This bulletin is 
updated at 8 a.m. the following day.  The bulletin provides national and regional 
assessment of avalanche threats on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).  These 
bulletins are available via a special telephone number and are also available on the 
radio in form of live interviews daily, shortly before 5 p.m.  The bulletins are 
developed by SLF based on 
 
• Meteorological forecasts 
• Automated wind (average and max wind speed within 30 minute intervals) 
and snow (height, fresh snow height, snow surface - and air temperature) 
stations 
• Local observers (ca 80) reporting on snow and weather conditions 
• Reports on actual avalanche occurrences 
• The "SNOPACK" model 
 
While the bulletin is adequate for general warnings, it needs to be 
supplemented/enhanced for use by the personnel responsible for safety.  Depending 
on the locality, the safety responsibility is with the political community, or with 
transportation systems transporting tourists into ski areas, or with the 
cantonal/regional road administration.  The safety specialists undergo a special 
education at the SLF and have direct electronic access to the avalanche bulletin as 
well directly to the relevant measurement stations.  The safety specialists are then 
responsible for closure of the ski areas, roads, and in the extreme, evacuation of 
houses (see Bründl et al., 2004, for details).  An interesting aspect of this so called 
IFKIS (see also IFKIS Information Manager, 2004) is that it not only includes 
information flowing from the SLF to the safety specialists but also between the safety 





The two warning systems have the required characteristics 
- An initial threat/event (earthquake) or general conditions (snow, wind) is 
recorded by technical devices and starts the process 
- Models and experience are used to make first interpretations 
- Further observations involve a combination of human and technical 
observations and are used to update the information. 
- In the avalanche case the updating then transfers to the local/regional safety 
specialists 
- Warnings are often gradual, involving an initial warning in preparation for the 
next step or a call-off 
- Regional/local entities issue the warning and the related countermeasures 
(evacuation, road closure) or call off the warning 
 
What the recent events and the Warning Systems above show is that it is necessary to 
evaluate risk management, in general, and warning systems, in particular.  Such an 
evaluation should allow one to compare different systems and their components in 
order to choose the most effective approach.  This will be attempted in the following. 
 
Formal Risk Assessment Procedure 
 
As the first author has shown at a number of occasions (e.g. Einstein, 1997), it is 
possible to use the structure of decision making under uncertainty (Figure 14a) to 
formalize the risk assessment process for natural threats (Figure 14b).  Potential 
threats (also called “danger” or “event”) are combined with a probability to express a 
hazard.  This in turn is combined with consequences to express risk (Risk = Hazard × 
Worth of Loss).  Formally, risk can thus be described as: 
 




R  =  Risk 
P[T]  =  Probability of Threat = Hazard 
u(  C) =  Utility of the consequences, where 
    C is a vector of attributes if one uses a multiattribute approach  
  (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Baecher, 1981) 
 
Usually one tries to also express the fact that the consequences are uncertain.  This is 
often called vulnerability and expressed by the conditional probability P[C|T] and 
thus risk: 
 
R = P[T] × P[C|T] ×  u (  C)   (2) 
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Risk Management, of which warning systems are a part, changes any one or all of the 
components of Eq. 2 such that a reduced risk R’ results.  (This has been discussed 
earlier by Einstein, 1997, but is quickly summarized here.)   
 
Active countermeasures reduce P[T] to P'[T] where P'[T] < P[T], e.g. tiebacks 
preventing a slope failure.  
 
Passive countermeasures reduce the vulnerability P[C|T] to P’[C|T] where P'[C|T] < 
P[C|T] or reduce the consequences from u(C ) to u(C ') where u(  C) < u(  C '), or both.  
Examples from the slope stability domain are: 
 
• A protective shed reduces the probability of rocks falling on a road – 
vulnerability reduction 
• A traffic signal triggered by falling rock reduces the speed of cars and thus the 
damage to a car hitting a rock lying on the road, i.e., it reduces the 
consequences.  (As a matter of fact, the traffic signal may also reduce the 
vulnerability i.e. the probability that a car hits a rock in the first place.) 
 
Active or passive countermeasures are associated with a cost and thus the expression 
for reduced risk will be for an active countermeasure: 
 
R’ = P’[T] × P[C|T] × u (  C) + u(CA) (3) 
 
Where u (CA) is the utility or in simpler terms the cost of active countermeasures.  
Similar expressions can be formulated for passive countermeasures or combinations 
of active and passive countermeasures.   
 
It may be desirable to also include the fact that countermeasures may not be 100% 
effective.  This is done best with Bayesian updating, e.g. for active countermeasures. 
 
  
PÕ[Tj] =PÕ[Tj | CE] = P[Tj] P[CE | Tj]







P’[Tj] and P[Tj] as above 
P[CE|Tj] = Probability that countermeasures will be effective 
Expression in denominator = Normalizing function 
 
In the decision cycles of Figure 14 a/b, such countermeasures can be represented by 
the updating cycles as shown in Figure 15. 
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 Eventually one will compare the original Risk R with the modified risk R’ and 
decide on implementing the countermeasures if R’ < R.  This is a somewhat 
simplistic approach and more subtle usages of decision analysis have been discussed 
by Keeney and Raiffa (1976), and Baecher (1981), as well as by the first author, 
Einstein (1997). 
 It has been mentioned previously that warning systems are a part of risk 
management.  In other words, they are a part of the countermeasures.  Usually they 
will be passive countermeasures reducing P[C|T] to P’[C|T] or changing u(  C) to 
u(  C ') or both.  For instance, warnings leading to evacuation are vulnerability 
reductions while the previously mentioned example of a traffic light in a rockfall area 
may affect the consequence directly [u(  C ')].  This consideration of warning systems 
is sufficient as an introduction in the context of the decision making process for risk 
assessment and management regarding natural threats.  The discussion of recent 
events and existing warning systems has, however, shown that warning systems are 
more complex and they will now be treated in more detail but still in the context of 
decision making under uncertainty. 
 




In the context of the formal risk assessment/management graphs of the preceding 
section (Figures 14 and 15), warning systems are characterized by: 
 
1. They are part of risk management, i.e. they trigger the passive (mostly) and 
active (occasionally) countermeasures through additional information in the 
updating cycles. 
 
2. Updating cycles may not be entirely effective, i.e. they are associated with 
uncertainties. 
 
Warning devices/systems trigger the countermeasures, and the triggering effect can 
be shown by adding to the diagram of Figure 15 as shown in Figure 16. 
 
The effectiveness of warning systems can be expressed by conditional probabilities. 
 
P[W|T] = Warning issued if threat exists 
P[NW|T] = No warning issued, if threat exists 
P[W|NT] = Warning issued, if no threat exists 
P[NW|NT] = No warning issued, if no threat exists. 
 
These expressions can be combined with the updating/modifications of the threat 
probabilities P[T] → P’[T] or vulnerabilities  P[C|T] → P’[C|T] and the associated 
utilities (costs) of the passive and active countermeasures as well as the utility (cost) 
of the warning system itself, to obtain the modified risk with warning systems.  The 
expression below shows this for an updating of vulnerabilities with warning systems. 
 
R’ = u[W] + [P[T] × P[W|T] × P’[C|T] × [u(  C) + u(CP)]] (5) 
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    + [P[T] × P [NW|T] × P[C|T] × u(C )] 




P[T] = Probability of Threat = Hazard 
P[C|T], P’[C|T] original and updated vulnerabilities, the latter includes the 
effectiveness of countermeasures as discussed earlier. 
u(  C) = utility (cost) of consequence 
u(CP) = utility (cost) of passive countermeasures 
u(W) = utility (cost) of warning system 
 
Similar expressions can be formulated for active countermeasures and combinations 
of active and passive countermeasures.  A good way to represent these interactions is 





The expressions discussed above can be conveniently structured in tree format.  
Figure 17 shows a tree where: 
 
- the warning device (system) is in place 
- it issues an alarm/or not 
- if the alarm is correct, countermeasures are taken/or not 
- the threat materializes/or not 
- the countermeasure is effective/or not 
- different damage levels occur 
 
Note that most of the nodes of the tree are so called chance nodes combining the 
results of the branches to the right.  However, the node "take measure or not" is a 
decision node.  The tree here represents well what was discussed previously, namely, 
a warning system included in a risk management system.  The assumed utilities 
(costs) represent the consequences/damages but also penalties (in parentheses) for 
having taken a wrong decision or having a non-functioning warning device.  The 
probabilities on the right most branches are also assumed and then propagated to the 
left with a total probability theorem.  Each node shows the corresponding 
probabilities and expected values. 
 Such trees can be easily formulated with spread sheets, which in turn allow 
one to run sensitivity analyses. 
 Figures 18a to c show simple examples using the numbers in the tree of Figure 
17.  They demonstrate the effect of the cost of the countermeasures, the effectiveness 
of the countermeasures and the probability of the threat on the expected cost.  All 
these cases show a cross-over for taking measures and not taking measures indicating 
when one or the other should be used. 
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 Another brief example involves the fundamental decision of using a warning 
device, or taking active countermeasures or passive countermeasures or taking no 
action (Figure 19a).  Each of these major branches can then be formulated as a sub-
tree such as that for the warning device in Figure 17.  Figure 19c shows the sub-tree 
"active countermeasure" with the significantly reduced probability of a threat.  Again 
sensitivity analyses can be performed such as the one shown in Figure 20 where all 
actions are compared as the probability of the threat changes, including also different 
effectiveness of the warning device (100%, 90%, 50%). 
 As can be easily imagined, formulating the entire problem, which is actually 
much more complex than what is shown in Figure 19a, will lead to very complex 





A Bayesian network is a representation of knowledge for reasoning under uncertainty. 
It is a concise representation of the joint probability of the domain that is being 
represented by the random variables.  
 Bayesian networks can be used at any stage of a risk analysis, and may 
substitute both fault trees and event trees in logical tree analysis. While common 
cause or more general dependency phenomena pose significant complications in 
classical fault tree analysis, this is not the case with Bayesian networks. They are in 
fact designed to facilitate the modeling of such dependencies. Because of what has 
been stated, Bayesian networks provide a good tool for decision analysis, including 
prior analysis, posterior analysis and pre-posterior analysis. Furthermore, they can be 
extended to influence diagrams, including decision and utility nodes in order to 
explicitly model a decision problem.  
 Bayesian networks and decision trees show different type of information. The 
Bayesian networks (influence diagrams) show the dependencies between variables 
more clearly than the decision trees. The decisions trees show in more detail all the 
possible scenarios and different paths, but for that reason they can become extremely 
large. The Bayesian networks are a much more compact representation of the 
problem.   
 Figure 21 shows a simple Bayesian Network applied to warning device. 
Essentially the damage will depend on whether or not the threat happens. The device 
issuing an alarm will depend also on the threat (reliability matrix). The decision of 
taking a measure will depend on the warning device issuing an alarm. Finally the 
utilities depend on the level of damage and on whether or not an action was taken and 
whether or not this action was effective.  
 Associated with utility nodes are utility functions that enable one to compute 
the expected utility of a decision. Table 1 shows an example of a utility node function 
for the warning device. Table 2 shows the conditional probability table for the 








The review of existing warning systems and of major events allows one to define 
what a warning system should consist of and where they failed.  In the following, the 
six essential elements (bold) of warning systems, possible problems with these 
elements and ways to eliminate these problems (cursive) are listed. 
 
 
1. The threat/event or general conditions likely to produce a threat are 
recorded by technical devices. 
 
 Technical devices may not exist, be destroyed or communication may be 
interrupted by the threat.   
 Install technical device and provide redundancies.   
 
 Several threats may occur in sequence (one initiates the next) and the 
technical devices etc. may not be equipped for this or get destroyed in the first 
threat. 
 Install technical device and provide redundancies. 
 
2. The information is transferred to "centers" where it is interpreted based 
on predictive models and experience. 
 
 Large scale models are usually quite adequate but may need some 
improvement; small scale models are often missing or are inadequate. 
 Further model development    
 Calibration of models   
  
 Humans are overwhelmed by information and/or make errors 
 The information transfer system needs to weed out non-essential information  
 Several independent redundant models    
 Experience  
 
 Decisions are affected by the potential consequences of over/under-reacting 
 Have a system/process which allows one to update decisions 
 
3. Depending on the interpretation, an initial warning is issued and 
transmitted to the potentially affected areas.   
 
 No clear assignment of responsibilities, no experience. 
 Plan and rehearse    
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4. Further observations involving a combination of human and technical 
observations are used to update the information and the predictions. 
 
 Often not done, hampered by technical inadequacies, lacking models, 
overwhelmed people. 
 Remedies as in Elements 1 and 2 above. 
 
5. The warning is updated, i.e. the warning level is increased or it is called 
off.  Transmission to the affected areas is as in Element 3 above. 
 
 Like 3 and:  Warnings rarely include warning of secondary consequences 
 Requires separate and different set of technical devices, models and 
interpretations.  
 
6. Local or regional entities decide after elements 3 and 5 on the 
countermeasures and initiate the countermeasures.  (At this point, 
transition from warning to countermeasures takes place and based on the 
discussed events, this is where most of the problems occurred.)  
 
 In evacuations, anything from the wrong timing to unwillingness to evacuate, 
to non-availability of transportation, including clogged roads, to false reaction 
including unnecessary panic can happen. 
 Well developed plans, property protection, intense education and rehearsals 
all based on a solid organization in which the affected population has 
confidence. 
 Since many unanticipated problems may occur, the evacuation and other 
countermeasures have to be flexible (with updating!) 
 Evacuation and other countermeasures are best if based on individual/local 
action with subsidiary higher level support  
 
 Physical active and passive countermeasures (floodgates, elevated buildings, 
etc.) are often necessary, but do not exist. 




This paper cannot provide a complete listing of warning systems; it cannot either list 
all things that can go wrong and how this can be prevented.  What it does, however, 
based on the formal decision making process is to describe and demonstrate, with 
simple examples, tools with which warning systems and risk management systems 
can be evaluated.  This should make it possible to prioritize what needs to be 
developed - in simple terms components that have the greatest effect on reducing the 
uncertainties and reducing the cost should be considered first.  The other message is 
that risk management and warning systems have to be flexible and updatable both 




Baecher, G.B. (1981).  "Risk Screening for Civil Facilities."  Massachusetts Institute 
of Tech., Dept. of Civil Eng. CER-81-9. 20p. 
 
Bründl, M.; Etter, H.J, Steiniger, M.; Klingler, Ch.; Rhyner, J.; Ammann, W.J. 
(2004.) IFKIS (Interkantonales Frühwarn und Kriseninformationssystem)-a basis for 
managing avalanche risk in settlements and on roads in Switzerland, Natural Hazards 
and Earth Sciences, No. 4, 2004. 
 
BWG - Bundesamt für Wasser und Geologie, Bericht über Hochwasser 2005. BWG, 
Dec. 2005. 
 
CNI- Cable News International (several citations with specific dates). 
 
Dalrymple, R.A.; Kriebel, D.L. (2005). "Lessons in Engineering from the Tsunami in 
Thailand." The Bridge - Summer 2005, National Academy of Engineering . 
 
Einstein, H.H. (1997.) “Landslide Risk - Systematic Approaches to Assessment and 
Management”, Proc. Int’l Workshop on Landslide Risk Assessment, Hawaii. 
 
ENR - Engineering News Record (several citations with specific dates). 
 
Gonzales, F. (2005). Tsunamis. Talk at MIT, April 7, 2005. 
 
Harris-Galveston County Hurricane Evacuation Plan 
 
Hayes, B. (2005.) "Natural and Unnatural Disasters," American Scientist Vol. 93. 
 
Hegg, Ch.; Vogt, S. (2005.) Hochwasserabschätzung in kleinen Einzugsgebieten, 
Projektbeschreibung, URL:www.wsl.ch. 
 
Hugin Expert : http://www.hugin.com/ 
 
IFKIS Info Manager (2004). Informationsystem für Naturgefahren, SLF, 2004. 
 
Information Clearing House - (2004). Swedish paper "Expressen" 12/28/04. 
 
Keeney, R.L.; Raiffa, H. (1976). Decision Analysis with Multiple Conflicting 
Objectives. John Wiley and Sons, New York. 
 
Lautenbacher, L.C. (2005). "Tsunami Warning Systems." The Bridge - Summer 2005, 
National Academy of Engineering . 
 
 20
Liu, L.-P. Lui. (2005). "Tsunami Simulations and Numerical Models." The Bridge - 
Summer 2005, National Academy of Engineering . 
 
Luterbacher, J. (2005). "Das verflixte Genua Tief." NZZ, Aug. 25, 2005. 
 
Meltzer, M.I.; Cox, N.J.; Fukuda, K. (1999). "Modelling the Economic Impact of 
Pandemic Influenza in the United States.  Implications for setting priorities for 
intervention." Background Paper, National Center for Infectious Diseases.  
 
Mlakar, P.F. (2006). "The Behavior of Hurricane Protection Infrastructure in New 
Orleans." The Bridge - Spring 2006, National Academy of Engineering . 
 
Mörgeli, (2005).  "Verwüstung an unserer Volkskraft -  Grippepandemie von 1918 - 
Behörden zuerst beschwichtigend dann hilflos," NZZ Nov. 16, 2005. 
 
NZZ Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Several citations with specific dates) 
 
Russel, S., Norvig, P. (2003). "Artificial Intelligence – a Modern Approach." Prentice 
Hall (ed.), 933pp. 
 
Schweizer Eisenbahnrevue. (2005) No 8-9. 
 
Synolakis, C. (2005). Talk at MIT, May 5, 2005. 
 
Synolakis, C.; Okal, E.; Bernard, E. (2004). "The Megatsunami of December 26, 
2004." The Bridge - Summer 2005, National Academy of Engineering . 
 
Von Hillebrandt-Andrade, Ch., G.; Moreno, V.H. (2004). “Emergent Tsunamis 
Warning System for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.” Proc. Caribbean Tsunami 
Workshop, March 30/31, 2004. 
 
Wolshon, B. (2006). "Evacuation Planning and Engineering for Hurricane Katrina." 
The Bridge - Spring 2006, National Academy of Engineering. 
 
World Socialist Web Site. (2005). "The Asian Tsunami.  Why there were no 
warnings." URL: WSWS. Org.  Jan. 3, 2005.  
 
WSL/SLF - Schnee und Lawineninfo. Produkte, URL:  www.slf.ch. 
 
 21
 Figure 1. The "Genoa Low" on 22.08.05  
 (from BWG 2005 
 
 
Station Rainfall Max Historic 
Value 
Recorded on Measurements 
Since 
Engelberg 190 mm 153 mm 21.12 1991 1901 
Einsiedeln 152 mm 142 mm 07.08.1978 1900 
Meiringen 205 mm 159 mm 07.03.1896 1889 
Marbach/LU 181 mm 165 mm 02.06.2004 1961 
Napf 178 mm 158 mm 13.02.1990 1978 
 
Figure 2. 48 Hour Rainfall in 2005 Alpine Flood compared to Preceding 




Figure 3. Flooding in Switzerland on August 23  
 NZZ August 30, 2005
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Figure 4.  Effect of Summer 2005 Flood on NS Transportation Axes. From East to 
West: Bernadino Highway Axis - closed.  Gotthard Railroad and Highway 
Axis - closed. Lötschberg Railroad Axis - closed. Lasanne Simplon 






Figure 5. Emergency Preparation of Old Embankment along the Linth Canal 











Figure 6. Hurricane Katrina Actual Path (Level 3 over Florida, increases to Level 5 






Figure 7. Drainage Canals New Orleans 
 Breaks Occurred along 17th Street Canal, London Avenue Canal and Inner 
Harbor Navigation Canal 
 Also overtopping occurred at the Michaud Levee "Lock" on right side of 
photo. 





Figure 8. Flood Map New Orleans, September 9,2005. 
 NPR Q+ A Draining New Orleans - September 9 Update 
 Map - US Army Corps of Engineers 
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 a.  Large Scale 
 
 
 b.  Detail in Baton Rouge 
 
Figure 9. Evacuation Plan, New Orleans 




Figure 10. Traffic Flow New Orleans Evacuation 









Figure 11b. Rita Actual Track 
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Figure 12. Galveston - Houston (Harris County) 





Figure 13. Evacuation from Rita, September 23, 2005 

































































Figure 15.   The Risk Decision Cycle for Natural Threats with Updating 





















0.20 -5000 + (-1500) = -6500
0.80
0.40 -2500 + (-1500) = -4000
0.40 0 + (-1500) = -1500
0.614
0.50 -10000 + (-1500) = -11500
0.40 -5000 + (-1500) = -6500
0.20
0.10 0+ (-1500) = -1500







0.50 -10000 + (-1200) = -11200
0.40 -5000 + (-1200) = -6200
0.019
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Figure 17.   Warning System - Decision Tree 



























1 : Take measure
2 : Do not take measure
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Table 1 – Utility Node function Table 2 – Warning Device 
chance node function 
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